iBooks & Price-Fixing

Justice Denise L. Cote, in her recent ruling on Apple's eBook price-fixing trial:

The agency model presented one significant problem. Apple wanted its iBookstore to be a rousing success. For that to happen, Apple needed not only content but also customers. Apple realized that if it moved to an agency model with the Publishers, Apple would be at a competitive disadvantage so long as Amazon remained on the wholesale model and could price New Releases and NYT Bestsellers at $9.99, or even lower to compete with Apple. Since it was inevitable that the Publishers wouldraise e-book prices when given the opportunity –- indeed, Apple expected the Publishers to raise the prices to the tier caps -- e-books priced at $9.99 by Amazon would doom the iBookstore. Why would a consumer buy an e-book in the iBookstore for $14.99 when it could download it from Amazon for $9.99? To ensure that the iBookstore would be competitive at higher prices, Apple concluded that it needed to eliminate all retail price competition. Thus, the final component of its agency model required the Publishers to move all of their e-tailers to agency. Apple expected that this proposal would appeal to the Publishers. After all, it would allow them to “fix” their “problem” with Amazon’s pricing. (p39,40)

Can I just come out an say what a load this whole thing is? Amazon was promoting and executing an unsustainable business model, not unlike what Google did with Reader.

Chris Meadows:

Amazon sells it at below wholesale, as a “loss leader”—breaking even or losing money on the deal to promote sales of the Kindle and grow its share of the market. (Giving away the blades to sell the razor, as it were.)

 

Thus, if a hardcover book has a suggested retail price of $24.95, Amazon pays the publisher about $12.50 for the e-book version—and loses about $2.50 when it turns around and sells it for $9.99.

As Cote herself notes, Apple's iBookstore was doomed to be a failure if Amazon was going to continue undercutting any other competitor who planned to make a profit. That means only others who were willing to be so-called "loss-leaders" would have any hope of competing, which is why Amazon had ~90% of the ebook market in 2009. And this unsustainable model had a very real dark side lurking for either consumers or publishers, as Laura Miller writes:

Obviously, however deep its pockets, Amazon would not be able to go on selling e-books at a loss indefinitely. But once Amazon was cemented in place as the uncontested sovereign of e-book retail, it could do whatever it wanted: force publishers to reduce their own prices, and/or raise prices on consumers.

Apple wasn't willing to be a loss-leader, and they knew what the future was for publishers if Amazon went uncontested for long enough. So they told the publishers that they intended to take 30% and still sell their books equal to the lowest price available - that of Amazon. They pushed the publishers in that direction and made them aware of Amazon's most likely end-game (being forced to sell books for less, often much less, and take a severe cut in profits). Here Alex Hern is in agreement with Laura Miller:

[I]nvestors expect Amazon's profit to increase at some point in the future. But there's only two ways that could happen: either Amazon vastly increases its revenue, or it vastly increases its profit margin.

 

It sounds almost conspiratorial, but the only way the company can really do this – and its actions indicate that it knows it – is by becoming the only player in town. Amazon's success to date has been built around winning every price war going, but once it gains control of a field, then it wins that price war by default.

There's nothing inherent in the Agency model that prevents any of the publishers from going cheaper and trying to undercut their competition. Apple essentially ensured that retailers could sell books at a profit and made sure that the publishers didn't shoot the price (at least on the iBookstore) through the roof.

When it comes to companies like Amazon, there's just no accounting for Jeff Bezos' gleeful willingness to sell at a loss — a long-term strategy that they would have gotten away with if it weren't for those meddling kids!

Generic... Eventually

Jonathan Stempel:

"We no longer see a need to pursue our case," Apple spokeswoman Kristin Huguet said. "With more than 900,000 apps and 50 billion downloads, customers know where they can purchase their favorite apps."

The way Apple abandoned this case is basically a slap across the face of Amazon. Their 'appstore' is so inconsequential that Apple need not waste it's resources any further trying to stop them from piggybacking on Apple's branding success.

Nonetheless, the original defence for the usage of 'appstore' was that the term had become so generic that customers would not be mislead. I find this line of thinking to be laughable! One company can steal another's ideas and implementations (Samsung, I'm looking at you) and then simply wait until trial, at which point the IP in question has become so diluted that it is, in fact, generic. Does no one else see how crazy this is?

I know I find that infuriating as an on-looker. I cannot imagine how it would feel as the inventor of the idea.

EDIT: Repaired the article.

Regarding iBooks links to Kindle Store

John Gruber:

My recommendation would have been for Apple to suggest to Godin that he change the links to point to iBookstore versions of the books, but if Godin didn’t want to, to let it slide.

I have never understood why online retailers are expected to be as open as the web ideally is. If these are the rules for selling content through Apple, then these are the rules for selling content through Apple. Simple.

Glenn Fleishman chimes in:

@gruber I don’t buy the iBookstore/B&N equivalency. Apple is asking for books to be changed b/c content doesn’t accord w/commercial policy.

Seriously? No. Apple has no problems with the content. This is with a commercial link to an alternate store. This is like Montana's buying steaks from a guy who includes directions to and a menu for The Keg. There's no problem with the beef, it's the push to a rival company that is the problem.

iPad Doesn't Have It, So It's Better!

Matt Brian:

Amazon has targeted the iPad in previous commercials, highlighting the difficulty some face when using the device in direct sunlight, but the company has just released a new advert, going for Apple and its iPad over pricing.

The message here seems to be "cheaper is better" — not sure that's true. Also, it doesn't matter what a given product has, if Apple's equivalent (or competing) product doesn't have it, it's better.

  • It has a pen! (Already died - it was called the 90s)
  • There's a 5-inch screen! (Already tried, and failed)
  • 3D! (We'll see - hasn't been doing so great for Nintendo)

People who have a Kindle love it. People who've used a Kindle Fire usually agree with Matt Brian:

appreciate the Kindle Fire delivers an incredible amount of content for the price, but it’s still a long way from being the finished product, especially when compared to the iPad.

Amazon to Open Brick & Mortar Store?

Laura Hazard Owen:

A new report suggests that Amazon (NSDQ: AMZN) is opening a small, Kindle-focused retail store in Seattle to test whether the concept could be expanded to other markets.

I've always felt like Amazon's greatest strength (and the reason they were able to keep prices down) was their online only approach. Kindle is the defacto standard e-reader. If someone's not sure what Nook or Kobo is, you tell them it's "like a Kindle".

Apple, Foxconn, and Working Conditions

 

BSR, the company that the NYT used as a source for their shocking exposé on Apple said today:

There are several areas where the text you provided us is inaccurate and therefore presents an inaccurate account of events you aim to describe. It is untrue that Apple has consistently disregarded advice that BSR has provided about problems related to working conditions in its supply chain.

Also, Foxconn manufactures products for companies:

  • Acer Inc. (Taiwan)
  • Amazon.com (United States)
  • Apple Inc. (United States)
  • ASRock (Taiwan)
  • Asus (Taiwan)
  • Barnes & Noble (United States)
  • Cisco (United States)
  • Dell (United States)
  • EVGA Corporation (United States)
  • Hewlett-Packard (United States)
  • Intel (United States)
  • IBM (United States)
  • Lenovo (China)
  • Logitech (Switzerland)
  • Microsoft (United States)
  • MSI (Taiwan)
  • Motorola (United States)
  • Netgear (United States)
  • Nintendo (Japan)
  • Nokia (Finland)
  • Panasonic (Japan)
  • Philips (Netherlands)
  • Samsung (South Korea)
  • Sharp (Japan)
  • Sony Ericsson (Japan/Sweden)
  • Toshiba (Japan)
  • Vizio (United States)

(via WikipediaMacworld)

Competing Tablets

Alistair Barr on the purpose of Amazon Tablets:

Amazon is making its own tablets to help the company sell more digital goods, such as MP3s, movies, TV shows, apps and games. Physical versions of these products, such as CDs and DVDs, were a big business for Amazon, but they are now in decline.

Hardware is a secondary concern for Amazon, like it is for Google. The tablet doesn't matter nearly as much as what it can be used to sell. In Amazon's case that's stuff - to us. In Google's case it's us, to advertisers. But if their ends are important and the tablet is the vehicle being used to deliver those ends... I'd want a nice car.